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By Yuzo DEGUCHI* 
I Introduction 
Marx wrote in the "introductory remarks" to his "Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy" a list of eight categories "as a point to 
be discussed here and also as a point to be kept in mind", of which the 
fifth category runs as follows : 
The "dialectic of the two concepts "productive powers" (means of produc-
tion) and "relations of production" is a dialectic for determining their 
limitations, and yet one which in reality does not remove the distinction!). 
It is by no means an easy task to understand the meaning of this 
brief sentence. Not a few people, I think, would simply laugh it off 
when the dialectic with respect to productive powers and the relations of 
production should happen to become a topic of discussion, by saying 
that everyone nowadays has the opinion that it is simgly a matter requir-
* Professor of Economics, Kyoto University 
I) Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Werke, Bd. 13, 1961, S. 640 ; Complete Works of Marx-
Engels, Vol, 13, 1964, p.636, This "introductory remark" is printed, as is generally 
known, on Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Okonomie (IWhentwurf) 1875-1858, Ber· 
lin, 1953, p.29, and also on its Japanese translation, Vol. I, p.31, But in the latter 
edition the text is numbered in a slightly different way and it is noted that "Unter-
schiede" is printed in the singular form "Unterschicd", It appears that in the edition 
o[ the Complete Works the error must have been corrected, 
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ing no further explanation if seen from the aspect of the common sense-
view of the theory of the materialistic interpretation of history, and 
that it only shows how foolish it would be to go through all the trouble 
of taking up such problems these days after so long a time. Neverthe-
less, I can't help thinking that the logical structure between these two 
concepts has not yet been clarified completely and sUfficiently. As far as 
my knowledge is concerned, Mr. Kichiroku Tanaka has a most thorough-
going understanding with regard to one phase of logic which I shall dis-
cuss in this paper, and I have been grateful to him for helpful advice 
and instruction2}. Yet I can't think that all the relationships between 
productive powers and the relations of production could be fully explain-
ed in the light of Mr. Tanaka's understanding. Needless to say, I don't 
dare to say that I can give a complete answer to this problem myself, 
but what I want to try to do is to demonstrate my way of approaching 
the problem for a start, and then to suggest that the logic pertaining to 
the relationships between productive powers and the relations of produc-
tion naturally leads to ultimately having some connection with other fun-
damental problems of political economy. 
II How to Grasp Dialectical Reasoning 
The way of thinking of Marxian economics is characterized by the di-
alectical way of thinking. However, although such a particular way of 
thinking seems to be something firmly established as far as diction is 
concerned, it is in reality no more than "so many men, so many minds", 
or "every man having his own way". It is not rare occasion that among 
certain people a certain way of thinking which can by no means be 
regarded as dialectical thinking is pretended to be dialectical thinking. 
Before further proceeding to take up the problems arising out of the 
correlations between productive powers and the relations of production 
in this paper it would be suitable for me and convenient for the readers 
to define, first of all, what I want to call a dialectical structure, because 
it would help readers to understand my view and also because it would 
be a natural course to ask for criticism. Therefore, I would like to give 
my own view on this particular point, before I take up the main issue 
of the problem. 
In the first place, when dialectical logic is to be defined, we have two 
wa ys. One of the two is called the "identity of things in opposition" 
2) Kichiroku Tanaka, "Theoretical Explanation oE Productive Powers and Relations 
o[ Production-Theoretical Orientation in a Circlc", Shiso, No. 320, February 1951, pp. 
118-133, and No, 321, March 1951, pp.215-232; the same author, "Element of Historical 
Materialism and Two Kinds of Production", ibid., No. 430, April 1960. 
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(Einheit der Gegensatze). For example, reference can be made to the "Note 
on Philosophy" by Lenin, in which he made the following statement: 
"In short the dialectic can be .defined as "a theory concerned with the 
identity of things in opposition")). In the second place, when the logical 
structure of the dialectic is talked about, three specific categories "These-
Antithese ~ Synthese" or "Affirmation - Negation - Negation of Negation", 
- are taken into consideration where the structure of this logic is shown 
in the form of a "Triade" or "Triplicity". 
It was Mr. Sozo Kitagawa who fully discussed "which one of these two 
definitions was right"Jl. At that time the original word 'Einheit', was 
expressed as 'unification' by him in conformity with the prevailing 
practice of those days, and he drew the conclusion that the first type of 
definition was right. 
I also agree with Kitagawa's view, but I can't agree with his idea that 
these two different ways of thinking mutually exclude each other. I am 
of the opinion that it should, rather, be considered that these two differ-
ent ways of thinking are the results of two different definitions of the 
structure of the dialectic advanced from two different angles, and that the 
way of approach of the first type would be more basic or original than 
the other. Generally speaking, the dialectical logic is a generalized 
concept used to substantiate the universal structure of historical realities, 
and an attempt to express that universal structure in a straightforward 
manner naturally leads to the concept of the "identity of things in 
opposition". But, just because realities are inherently of a historical na-
ture, it becomes essential to express this structure in a dynamic manner. 
In doing so, the dialectical logic comes to be expressed in the form of 
Triplicity. Therefore, it is correct to say that the structure of dialec-
tical logic is fundamentaly shown in the form of the "identity of things 
in opposition", and consequently the second definition may be thought 
of as its corollaril. Then, it would not be entirely adequate to 
consider that the two different definitions mentioned above are in opposi-
tion to each other. However, if we should choose the more original 
definition of these two, it should be the "identity of things in opposition"6). 
-~Lenin a};o~ade-a statement that "trinominality is an external and superficial side~ 
view of the dialectic", See Note on Philosophy, Vol. 1, p.232, lwanami-Bunko-ed., Ibid., 
Complete Works of V. I. Lenin, p. 198. 
3) V. I. Lenin, Note on Philosophy, Vol. I, p.221, Iwanami-Bunko-cd., Complete Works 
of V. 1. Lenin, Japanese ed., Vol. 38, p.191. 
4) Sow Kitagawa, Methodology of Economics, 1954. 
6) The logic of the "'S,ll-identity of Absolute Contradiction"' maintained by Kitaro 
Nishida can also be counted as one definition of the dialectic, though it is often 
disliked. b~' Marxian economists, All such terms as things in opposition, absolute 
contradlctlOn, self-idenLity and unification appear to me to denote onc and the same 
state of things. 
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Now, we should consider some twofold problems: one is what is meant 
by "things in opposition" and the other is "identity"7). 
(I) Opposition or Things in Opposition 
The terms "opposition" or "things in opposition" are the ordinary 
translations of the word "Gegensatze". What do these words mean in 
dialectical logic ? 
Generally speaking, there exist different kinds of opposition. What 
we are going to discuss now is the three kinds of opposition. The first 
is contrary opposition. For example, it is the opposition of the colour 
red against the colour white. Although opposition of this kind may so 
occur that opposition in sports might of necessity result in having differ-
ent colours for rooters' pennants, it is after all opposition in the form 
of a difference in colour. As we can conceive a colour-field in the back-
ground of the opposition of red against white, this kind of opposition 
exists as the two extremities in this field. And there can exist a variety 
of intermediate points between the two extremities. In other words, there 
exists the extremity of red on the one side, and the extremity of white 
on the other: between these two extremities there exist miscellaneous 
intermediate colours such as pink, crimson, etc. etc. Those other miscel-
laneous tones of colour are all no more than mixtures of the two extre-
mities, and we can say that the colours nearer red are composed both 
of the affirmation of red and the negation of white, and, contrariwisely, 
that the colours nearer white are composed both of the affirmation of 
white and the negation of red. Again, north-contra-south, east-contra-west, 
right-contra-left, up-contra-down, etc. are examples of contrary opposi-
tion, but they all represent a kind of opposition which is only possible 
under a certain condition. For example, a particular place which is 
located to the north of a given place comes to be to the south when 
riewed from a place located further north than it, and likewise a parti-
cular direction to be thought of as the right side comes to be the direc-
tion facing toward left side when one turns his body round. So, contrary 
opposition is a relative opposition. And when we widen our field of vision, 
or change the position of our body or enlarge our consciousness, the 
opposition ceases to exist. For this reason, this opposition is an abstract 
kind of opposition. 
7) My view ,with respect to the way of thinking of dialectical logic is given in 
my "Current Thoughts 011. the History of EC01Z0mics", Japanese ed., 1968, p.25. My 
writing there was very briefly made as a footnote with the intention of only help-
ing easier understanding of the meanings o[ the wording 'unification of aHirmation 
and negation', but I don't think that it was noted by many readers. That is why I 
want to further discuss here how to grasp the meaning of identity of afEirmation and 
negation, 
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The second kind of opposi tion is contradictory opposition. Such oppo· 
sition is caused by the competition between two extremities in opposing 
each other: if one of them can stand, the other is forced to fall: only 
one of the two extremities can maintain its existence. Opposition of this 
kind is characterized by the two extremities rejecting each other, negat-
ing each other not partially but totally, and having no room to be 
generous enough to acknowledge and affirm the opponent. It will give 
hel p for easier understanding if a game is taken as an exam pIe. The 
saying of "A serpent-and-tiger fight" well illustrates an immutably strict 
rule in the sporting world: a drawn game or a tie being nothing but 
an improvised disposal for convenience' sake to keep playing games. 
Just because of the lack of mutual acknowledgement of common ground 
on which each of them can co-exist, this kind of opposition is deeper 
than contrary opposition. 
Nevertheless, upon thinking the matter over, we find that the second 
kind of opposition ceases to exist on some occasions. Two wrestlers who 
fought to the finish in the ring will drink in a happy mood at a con-
gratulatory banquet. Those players who played hard and were encouraged 
by the roaring cheers of the supporting spectators might praise the good 
effort of the opposite party by cheering each other. Contradictory oppo-
sition too is brought forth only under certain conditions and this kind 
of opposition also ceases to exist under another conditions. When viewed 
in this way, contradictory opposition is also of a relative kind. 
Ordinarily, when the contradictions in a particular society are talked 
about, contradictory opposition of this kind is often talked about. When 
one notices varied kinds of oppOSition, arising out of the structure or 
movements of a society many people think that those kinds of opposition 
in general are of the specific kind of contradictory opposition. When 
an effort is made to grasp the structure or movements of a society 
logically, it is true that what has been manifested only vaguely will become 
clear if the eyes are focussed on "the thi ngs in opposition". We can 
understand the structure through the concept of the "correlations of 
opposition" or "relations of opposition", and social reality will be disposed 
of through the "logic of oppOsition". But in order to do so it becomes 
necessary for us to further consider the nature of "opposition". And we 
must know that there does exist another kind of opppsition. 
By opposition of a third kind we mean such opposition as exists under 
special conditions where the contradictory opposition of two extremities 
is negated. By special conditions we mean that the two extremities of 
contradictory opposition are mutually in need of the existence of the 
other. In spite of all this, the reason why it is said that "they are opposed 
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to each other" lies in the fact that they mutually reject each other, each 
of them treating the other as a nuisance. Furthermore they are in a 
state where the affirmative relationship and the negative relationship 
are substantially combined together or are not separated from each other. 
And opposition of this kind is not relative opposition but absolute oppo-
sitIOn. Such opposition is dialectical opposition. 
The present writer has made a statement in a foot note given in my 
"Current Thoughts on the History of Economics" saying that "dialectical 
opposition in the real sense of the word means a particular kind of 
contradiction which is given rise to only under such conditions where 
two propositions, such as "A is B" and "A is not B", could substantially 
exist simultaneously, and furthermore where one of them could be condi-
tioned by the other"'l. My description in this paper is given with the 
emphasis placed on "opposition". If readers try to read A or B in the 
above mentioned sentence as two "extremities", it will help them to un-
derstand that the description mentioned in this paper and the foot note 
mentioned were written to demonstrate one and the same thing. 
J had an opportunity this year to read a book entitled "Dialectical 
Opposition - Forms and Functions" (1964) written by Gottfried Stiehler 
in the German Democratic Republic. I found that the direction of 
approach which I had been trying to make for a long time in the past 
was also taken up by a presumably young scholar. He is a scholar of 
Hegelian philosophy and a German researcher of the theory of the ma-
terialistic interpretation of history, and particularly a man with a mind 
devoted to the study of the logical structure of ideas such as contradiction 
and opposition9). Although it can't be said that the contents of his book 
8) Y. Deguchi, Current Thoughts on the History of Economics, 1968, p.25. 
9) Given here is a list of works by the author Gottfried Stiehler, arranged in calendar 
sequence: a) Hegel und der Marxismus uber den Widerspruch, 1960; b) Beitriige zur 
Geschichte des vormarxistischen Materialismus, hrsg. von G. Stichler, 1961, In this book 
are compiled varied studies of prominent representatives of German materialism and 
religious criticism during the 17th-18th centuries, which are written by six authors, 
including Stiehler, being composed of the introduction and studies on five thinkers, 
such as the atheist in Magdeburg, Gabriel Wagner, Friedrich 'Vilhelm Stosch, Theo-
dor Ludwig Lau and August von Einseidel; c) Die Dialdtik in Hegels. Phiinomenolo-
gie des Geistes, 1964 ; d) Der d'ialektische Widerspruch, Farm81l und F'unktionen, 1966, It 
was in the late autumn of 1963 that I wrote my opinion about dialectical opposition 
as a foot note to my essay previously referred to, Therefore, Stiehler's book shown 
as the first item in the above Jist had already been made public and the book was 
available at our Library of Faculty of Economics of Kyoto University, But I didn't 
know of the existence of this book until recently and it was this year that I read the 
book listed last. It was noted in the introduction to his first book that Stiehler had 
already made a statement that the problem of dialectic contradictions constitutes the 
peculiar nuclei of the dialectic, (G, Stiehler, Hege! und der J.l1arxismlts USW" S. 8. ) It 
was also found that when he began to explain this contradiction in his "dialectical 
contradiction", he expounded his description exactly in the same order as I did in 
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are totally filled with novelty and originality or that his research is of 
the first grade, because something of the remnants of the old principle 
of authoritarianism based on Stalinism are found here and there, we can 
at the same time find not a few opinions worthy of note for reference' 
sake. Now, in this connectil'n by introducing some of his ideas for one 
thing and by showing my view which I have had for a long time for 
another, I want to demonstrate what I have been maintaining to be the 
structure of dialectical logic. 
According to G. Stiehler, the distinction between contradictory nega-
tion and dialectical negation is made clear in the following way: 
" ..... In other words things or phenomena are after all divided or 
separated into two classes in the case of contradictory negation - (for 
example labourers and non-labourers). The fact that these classes stand in 
opposition is restricted on the basis of a certain indication which shows 
that class A', which is a supplementary class to class A lacks some sub-
stantial characteristics of class A. These two classes are mutually connected 
together only by negation or by mutual rejection. On the contrary, in 
the case of dialectical negation, negation and affirmation are inseparably 
combined. The phenomena of negation and affirmation are mutually 
combined solidly together by the instrumentality of a given objective 
systematised relationship (Beziehungssystem) - (for example a close tie 
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie through the instrumentality 
of the means of capitalistic production), Therefore as far as these par-
ticular phenomena of affirmation and negation constitute essential factors 
to build up a systematic relationship such as the means of capitalistic 
production, they are essentially in accord with each other. It is true that 
my short writings given above and also in this paper, which might seemingly appear 
to be a strange COincidence, But I am inclined to think that it was because we were 
grasping, hand in hand, the structure 01 the plurality of contradiction itself, rather 
than to think that it was a mere coincidence. 
According· to his writings in the "Dialectic in 'Mental Phe,Dmeno[ogy' of Hegel", the 
subject matter of his sludy is described as follows: "Such eHorts as to make a further 
study more closely of this problem - the role of things in opposition as an element 
to prescribe the substantial qualities of things - have not been completed even in the 
valuminous literature concerned with Marxism, What gives rise to a problem under 
such circumstances is not only the state of things seen from the point of views of 
existentialism but also the state of things seen from that oE epistemology, Generally 
speaking, if things or phenomena are to be prescribed in some way or other as ex-
tremities of certain relationships of opposition (GegensatzverhSiltnisse), and if such a 
prescription muse be the final form of the substantial nature of ,things or phenomena, 
then it must also be clear enough that this study ought to play an impof[ant role in 
the particular purpose of the ideological grasping of reality," (Ibid., 5S, 77-78.) I am 
inclined to agree totally with this opinion, In the meantime, when I come across his 
passage, stating that "the relationship of opposition is one of the most fundamental 
and the mOst basic forms" o[ all correlations of the inherent order of reality, I think 
that it is a very bold declaration, (Ibid., S. 50.) 
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they are distinguished by essential characteristics, but at the same time 
they coincide with each other. Then, the inner contradiction of the 
two extremities are produced or realised by dialectcial negation. "10) 
These complex relationships between two extremes can be expressed as 
"dialectical opposition", but besides this we have many other ways of saying 
it. Discord (Zwietracht, Nichtiibereinstimmung), conflict (Konflikt, Wider-
streit), tension (Spannung), mutual exclusion (Sich-Ausschliessen), antag-
onism (Antagonismus), dissension (Entzweiung), polarization (Polariza-
tion), Disproportion (Disproportion) - these are various expressions of 
the many phases of dialectical opposition. 
(2) Identity or Unity 
I have said above of dialectical opposition that it is opposition "under 
a special state of affairs where the contradictory opposition of two 
extremities is negated". This statement means that one extremity mutually 
depends on the other extremity as the essential condition for its own 
existence, and thus co-exists in an inseparable state. Hegel changed the 
wording 'identity' into 'inseparable state' (Ungetrenntheit) and Lenin, 
remarking on this term, wrote that such wording is much better than 
the term 'unity' (Einheit)lD. The present writer hopes, taking special 
note of this fact, that superficial understanding resulting from the term 
"unity" or "unification" could be done away with. 
The concept of "unification" has been used widely in ordinary cases. 
In these cases, it seems that the opposition of two chances is considered 
to dissolve into each other by uniting themselves together, so that har-
mony and peace may be produced in a newly developed entity. Again, 
since unifying will suggest some practical function, such as control-
i ng or supervising, it is very likely that the use of this term is to be 
welcomed from the standpoint that dialectical logic has a necessary 
connectiQn with man's practical actions. Similarly, when the word "syn-
thesis" was used, one couldn't be free from this trend of thinking. 
Now, when we ask whether there is any expression in use other than 
"unification", the answer is "No". Going back to the classics of Hegel, we 
can find such expressions as "inseparateness" (Ungetrenntheit), "insepara-
bility" (U ntrennbar keit), "self identity" (Sichselbsgleichheit), "identity" 
(ldentiUit), etc. and Lenin said that "inseparability" is better than "uni-
fication" as mentioned before. In addition, the correlations between two 
chances are sufficiently well expressed by terms such as "mutual produc-
10) G. Stiehler, Der dialektische Widerspruch, S. 25. As to the meanings of "Relation-
ships of Opposition" in this quotation, see what follows. 
II) V. I. Lenin, Note on Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 14, 44, Iwanami-Bunko-ed., Japanese 
transl., Complete Works of V. I. Lenin, Vol. 38, pp. 78-79. 
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tion" (Sich-Bedin~en). Other terms such as "compromise" (Versbhnung), 
"concurrence" (Ubereinstimmung), "parallel" (ParalleliUit), "balanced 
state" (Gleichgewichtszustand), etc. also serve the purpose of communicat-
ing the content of these affairs, though with the constant risk of 
giving rise to misunderstanding. 
What counts is that the oppositional existence of two extremities provides 
the essential condition for each of them to exist. It might as well be 
termed "mutual dependency", but this is not always an adequate expres-
sion, because it is likely to imply the existence of some causal relations 
between the two extremities. Between two extremities there exists in 
truth a relationship of simultaneous existence prior to a causal relation-
ship. This relation is primarily an ontological relationship, from which 
an epistemologistical relationship arises. 
(3) Identity of Things in Opposition 
All that was discussed in the foregoing section so far was given in the 
form of two separate items merely because of my intention of providing 
an easier understanding of the meanings of the "identity of things in 
opposition", which shows the structure of dialectical logic: "one entity 
to be conceived as being two and two entities as one". However, mere 
analytical thinking in such a manner would only serve to drive under-
standing of the real structure further and further away. Contrariwisely, 
the mere attempt to grasp two chances synthetically wouldn't serve to 
grasp the actual state of things. When one's eyes are directed only to 
one phase of opposition, a peaceful state of identity is lost sight of, and 
when it is attempted to grasp the whole from the phase of identity, there 
is no grasping of opposition. Such an idea with respect to the state of 
two things conceived as one, and the state of one thing conceived as 
two, is as a matter of fact two phases of one state of things. But when 
we intend to explai n it, we are obliged to take up either one of the 
two phases to begin with. We are thus led to understand that both of 
these explanations are in reality none other than a different explana-
tion of dialectical structure. 
In this connection I would like to make one more comment about one 
important point. When dialectical identity is spoken about in an ordi-
nary case, on many occassions it is often considered that a state of things 
in which there exists a "reciprocal interaction" (W echselwirkun~) be-
tween two mutually opposed extremities is called a case of identity, but 
it must be said that such a way of thinking is far from a complete grasp-
ing of the real state of things. 
It is quite adequate reasoning to consider dialectical logic under the gui-
dance of Spinoza, who maintained that logical determinations are "negation". 
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Those who might have the idea that an action of negation ansmg from 
one chance on the one side would give rise to another negation in the 
reverse direction from the opposing chance on the other side. whereby 
the simultaneous acknowledgement of these two courses of negation 
would mean the "negation of negation". and that all this should be the 
state of things which could be expressed in terms of so called unification 
or synthesis. are likely be led to consider that the very state of things 
characterized by "reciprocity" would be no more than a unified state of 
those interactions. Nevertheless. it is impossible to talk about "the iden-
tity of things in opposition" only through the category of "reciprocity". 
Why is this so? Well. what we can see in "reciprocity" is a kind of 
circular movement or. if stated more precisely. a number of circular 
movements. each of which respectively moves in a reverse direction. 
These movements. indeed. are important and certainly essential to the 
structure of dialectical logic. However. is it not also true that there is 
a state of mutual reliance which is a manifested form of the negation 
of such reciprocity in a state of "identity of things in opposition"? 
Now. commenting a little on the wording "mutual reliance" used here. 
it must be noted that each of the two chances is respectively character-
ized by its rejection of the other of its own accord. And we may with 
confidence say that the dialectical structure or framework is applied 
when it is intended to grasp a contradictory self-identity as a whole. 
Therefore. it follows that those who might have the idea that the logical 
structure of the dialectic can be demonstrated through the category of 
reciprocity must have no knowledge of the existence of another factor 
about things in opposition. An opposition or contradiction in the field 
of the dialectic is of a very complex nature. It is composed of duplicated 
oppositions. where one contradictory opposition may involve within itself 
another contradictory opposition. 
Another type of thinking with respect to the logic of the dialectic 
which seems to me to be quite popular holds that the logic of the dia-
lectic is none other than an ideological sublimation of a practical relation-
ship between subject and object12l • I would like to express my personal 
view about this. 
It is right to say that the dialectic is a logical cognition of human 
practical activities. Consequently. if the subject who enforces some action 
and the object with which the negotiation is being made are compared 
to two extremities. and their mutual reciprocal actions are to be acknow-
12) For example. see Chapter 12 of my History of Socia! Thoughts (Chikuma-Shobo-e d .• 
Collected Works of Economics. Vol. 2, 1967). This Chapter was written by Prof, Toshi-
hiko Hirai, 
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ledged and the relationships thus given rise therein in the form of "to 
make" and "to be made" are logically put in order from the standpoint 
of cognition, then it can be said that we can see the logic of the dialec-
tic lying right there. Because the reciprocal actions of these two extrem-
ities make the object itself on the basis of the cognitive activities of 
the subject and as a result the dynamic historical process can be 
brought to light, it can also be said that something worthy of the name 
of the logic of history may be obtainable from such an idea. 
However, one point about which we must be very cautious is that the 
subject and the object are both kept separate at the beginning, and that 
the logical reflection is made from the point where the practical negoti-
ation is started. And because it is maintained that the object is to be 
prescribed by the influence of the action initiated by the subject and at 
the same time that its reverse is also to be caused and that as a result 
reci procity appears, there are fears that the particular phases of artificial 
"unification" and "synthesis" rather than "identity" are likely to be 
exaggerated and on the contrary that the particular phase of "indivisi-
bility" of the subject from the object or "identity" is likely to be disre-
garded and that as a result such a way of thinking is likely to form the 
idea that the subject and the object can exist even without having any 
negotiation between them. If such an idea were to be formed, it would 
become impossible to assert that the dialectical structure has really been 
cognized, because such an idea is strictly concerned only with a theory 
of practice at the common sense level. Yet there are, as a matter of fact, 
a fairly great number of examples in which such a theory of practice 
at the common sense level has been applied to make assertions as if they 
were dialectical thinking. This is no way to make a correct elucidation 
of the dialectic or to improve the dialectical contemplations of such 
people. We must begin to think from the original linking of the subject 
and the object. 
So much for my view about the "identity of things in oppostion". 
(4) Relationships arising out of Opposition 
It is G. Stiehler, to whom I previously referred, who has attempted 
to explain the structure of the "identity of things in opposition" through 
such concepts as "the relationships arising out of opposition" (Gegensatz-
beziehung) or "correlations of polarization" (Polaritatsverhaltnis) by ob-
serving things in opposition and to make it a basic concept for grasping 
reality. According to him, "the relationships arising out of opposition 
are substantial component factors for all human affairs. From the view 
that the human world is nothi ng but the practice of human beings, all 
relationships between man and reality come to be represented as the 
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correlations of polarization"13). According to his assertion, during the 17th 
and 18th centuries the thought of causal correlations showed the mecha-
nism of changes of thinge, and in the 19th century such new thoughts 
as "relationships of opposition" or "correlations of polarization" came to 
be formed, particularly by the philosophers of German idealism, and he 
maintains that the train of these new thoughts would be sufficient to 
elucidate the logical structure of society and history. 
I don't think that it would be suitable to go into a thorough discussion 
here with respect to the extent of theoretical adequateness of the "corre-
lations of polarization" and the effectiveness of this as a basic principle 
for explaining history and sOciety. But I must take up the following 
points. 
Up to the present it has been held even in the field of practical and 
experimental sciences such as economics, being influenced by classical 
scientific theories, that the principal subject matter of cognition is the 
pursuit of causality. For that reason, to tell the truth, un justifiableness 
in the field of epistemology has been brought in and as a result not a few 
improvised countermeasures have been adopted in various manners. In 
the field of theoretical cognition it has been held on some occasions that 
the laws in social sciences, being different from the laws in natural 
sciences, should be "laws of tendency", and particularly in the field of 
cognition based on practicalism such unjustifiableness has grown to a 
conspicuously greater extent, thus being led into difficulty in explaining 
the relationship and harmony between the causative theory and practical 
teleology. For example, according to such a way of thinking it will 
suffice to take up Max Weber's theory of "freedom of valuation". When 
viewed as a cognition of practical science, it has gone beyond the self-
restriction of cognition, and passed to agnosticism. 
Also in economic theory some go as far as to argue, being stimulated 
by the latest achievements of natural science, that the law of economIcs 
should not be the law of causality in the strict sense of the word but 
the law of probability. As to what this means it gives rise to a question 
requiring further study, but at any rate we may say that the days when 
the classical concept of law in the field of social sciences used to play 
its part to the fullest extent are now passing away. Still more, even if 
the law of causality were to be modified, its intrinsic nature could 
never be clarified in the field of cognition based on the viewpoint of 
practicalism. As to epistemology in this field, I think that theories of 
--- ---------- --- --
13) Stiehler, ibid., S. 47. 
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a much more revolutionary nature should be further developed14l• 
Under such circumstance I can't help thinking that the particular way 
of thinking through which the structure of history or society is to be 
grasped dialectically through the category of "correlations of polarization" 
would promise remarkable developments in the future. But at present I 
shall have to put off discussing these views to some other opportunity. 
III Relationships between Productive Powers 
and Relations of Production 
(I) The Way of Thinking in the Past 
It was Karl Marx who formed the idea of the basic structure of a 
society which was conceived by grasping two states of affairs such as 
productive powers and relations of production unificatively as a mode of 
production by including various forms of transportation therein, and by 
applying his concept of the economic structure or system of society. 
About this, there would be no need of explanation. I also acknowledge 
that a pursuit as to how this train of Marxian thought came to be formed 
is really a worthwhile study. In this connection I would like first to 
scrutinize with respect to a few points the ways in which the rela-
tionships between the two concepts mentioned have been understood 
by many foreign and domestic Marxists and Marxian economists, and 
next to try to demonstrate a different way of thinking about the 
relationships between those two concepts based on a correct way of grasping 
the structure of dialectical logic which was discussed in the preceding 
section of this paper. Before going into the discussion of the main subject 
of this paper, I went into the preceding section a long and abstract 
discussion. But I think that only with such a preparatory discussion 
would it be possible for a reader to understand my contention. 
Now, under the title of "Form of Value" (in Chapter l, Paragraph 3 
of Volume I of "Capital") Marx made the following statement: the 
relative form and the equivalent form are two intimately connected, 
mutually dependent and inseparable elements of the expression of value; 
but, at the same time, they are mutual! y exclusive, antagonistic extre-
mes-i. e., poles of the same expression. They are allotted respectively 
to the two different commodities brought into relation by that expres-
sion15l. 
This statement is given in an explanation of the expression of value, 
14) It is meant here to further consider a society and its history based on such a £un-
d.amental structure <lS lhe "relationships of opposition" or "correlations o[ polariza-
tIon", 
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and it must be specially noted how excellently the notion of "identity 
of things in opposition" is described. It is a most precise narration of 
the real aspect of dialectical opposition between the forms of relative 
value and the forms of equivalent value. There are many who will 
understand the meanings of the latter half of this description, but few 
have a sufficient understanding of the meaning of the first half. Con-
sequently, the very inevitability of the linking of the two forms of value 
into a close relationship with each other-though the kind of goods 
which happen to be the two extremities are of an accidental nature-
is more likely to become hard to apprehend sufficiently and as a 
result this situation leads to overcognition of the factor of opposition. 
It is not until both the idea of the inseparability in the first half and 
the idea of the contradictory opposition in the latter half are grasped 
that we can have a clear understanding of the social meaning of gold. 
Gold as a form of money is, on the one hand, unification of value in use 
and value in exchange, and on the other hand, a fetish which is a 
product of labour and has a special natural form. Otherwise, the particu-
lar meaning that money, consequently gold, is only a social expression 
cannot be fully understood, and as a result it leads to a purely technical 
interpretation, which regards gold as nothing but a convenient means of 
exchange, thus giving rise to the ever present error that all the contra-
dictions of capitalism could be solved if gold as money were to be replaced 
by something else. 
The forms of relative value and equivalent value are expressions of 
the duality of labour-concrete useful labour and abstract human labour 
-in the forms of commodities. And if we are to think back further 
theoretically, the relationships between concrete useful labour and abstract 
human labour-which are also to be conceived in the relationships of 
dialectical opposition-should be argued by reducing them to the rela-
tionships of productive powers and relations of production. 
Now, we can estimate how Marx's view of the relationships between 
productive powers and the relations of production should be interpreted. 
Marx included some discussion of them in the so~called "Formula of 
the Materialistic Interpretation of History" in the Foreword of "A Con-
tribution to the Critique of Political Economy" and also in his "Capital", 
he discussed them a little more concretely. However, he didn't develop 
his arguments about the entire relationship of the two concepts in so 
detailed and elaborate a manner as would give us a correct understand-
ing of the two discussions, the former was too simply narrated to deal 
15) K. Marx, Das Kapital, Bd. 1 (Marx-Engels, Werke, Bd. 23, S, 63, English transl., 
Vol, I, p. 48, Moscow,1958), Italics by [he writor. 
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completely with the problems involved therein, and in the latter the 
subject matter treated was concerned mainly with the theoretical inevita-
bility of the decay of the capitalistic mode of production. 
(2) Marx's Narration 
I want to confirm Marx's view by selecting his most important descrip-
tions. 
It is in "Wage Labour and Capital" (1849) that the relationships 
of these two concepts were plainly narrated. In this work Marx said: -
"Capital therefore presupposes wage labour; wage labour presupposes 
capital. They condition each other; each brings the other into exist-
ence"16l, Marx says, "to say that the interests of capital and the interests 
of the workers are identical, signifies only this, that capital and wage-
labour are two sides of one and the same relation. The one conditions 
the other in the same way that the usurer and the borrower condition 
each other"l7). As is well· known, wage labour and capital are represen-
tations of productive powers and the relations of production in capitalist 
society. There, on the one hand, each of them mutually produces the 
other in such a particular manner that each of them presupposes the 
existence of the other for its own existence in an inseparable relation-
ship and, on the other hand, both of them stand in mutual antagonism. 
Such a dialectical relationship, is superbly described here. What gives 
rise to a problem in this connection is "How should we interpret these 
two expressions ?" 
Marx also made the following statements in the same work. "The 
productive powers of labour is increased above all by a greater division of 
labour and by a more general introduction and constant improvement 
of machinery"18l. "We thus see how the method of production and the 
means of production are constantly enlarged, revolutionised, how the 
division of labour necessarily grows after it into a greater division of 
labour, the employment of machinery into greater employment of machin-
ery, work upon a large scale into work upon a still greater scale. 
This is the law that continually throws capitalist production out of its 
old ruts and con pels capital to strain ever more the productive powers of 
labour for the very reason that it has already strained it-the law that 
grants it no respite, and constantly shouts in its ear : March! march!"IG) 
VVhat these words mean is, first, that productive powers appear as a 
.---~-.-.---;--;---:-
16) K, Marx, Lohnarbeit und Kapz'tal, (Werke, Bd. 6, S. 410, Japanese transl., Collected 
Works, Vol. 6, p. 406). 
17) Ibid., S. 411. English in K. Marx; Wage-Labour and Capital, International Publi· 
shers, Ne\..., York, 1933, p. 3~. Japanese trans1., ibid., p. 407, 
18) Marx-Engels, Werke, Bd. 6, S. 417, English in ibidem, p. 33, Japanese transl., 
Collected Works, Vol. 6, p.413. 
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result of the division of labour and, secondly, that though they always co-
exist with the relations of production, it is the latter that always expe-
dite production : in other words that the relations of production domi-
nate productive powers. On the other hand we note that Marx further 
made the following statement in the "Summary of the Critique of Politi-
cal Economy". "What we must bear in mind is that neither the new-
ly developed productive powers nor the relations of production created 
out of nothing, nor produced in the air or out of self-producing ideas, 
but that they develop within and against the existing development of 
production and the old traditional relations of ownership"20J. What is 
asserted here implies that the relationships of identity between produc-
ti ve powers and the relations of production are of a historical nature, 
and also that the relations may as well be replaced by the "various 
relations of ownership". Now, in this connection I must comment here 
on some arguments which might be expected to be raised against me. 
Since we know the statements given in the preface of "A Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy", such as "various relationships of owner-
ship which are nothing more than legal expressions of relations of pro-
duction"2D, some may contend that it is wrong to regard the various 
relationships of ownership in the same light as relations of production, 
though they may be the same in contents. To such an argument I 
would answer that it is not rare in some concepts of social science that, 
even under circumstances where the same expression is used, when used 
in a specific science, such a word is interpreted in a specific way which 
is somewhat different from the ordinary meaning of the word - for 
example, in the case of right and duty or value and interest. Therefore, 
I am of the opinion that there is nothing wrong in changing wording 
such as the relations of production into human relations which can be 
observed in a production process under a certain kind of ownership of 
the means of production. 
Consequently, if productive powers and the relations of production are 
to be expressed from the angle of their social nature, they should be 
expressed as the division of labour and relations of ownership. By the 
division of labour is meant the state of the conditions of the function of 
human and physical productive powers, and by the relations of ownership the 
state oJ ownership of productive powers. These two states are two motives 
of productive powers which are not of such a nature that the di vision of 
labour must exist before the relations of ownership appear, or conversely 
19) Ibid., German ed., S5. 118-419, English ed., p.43, Japanese ed., p.414. 
20) Grnltdrisse, S. 189, Japanese transl., Vol. 2. English by the writer. 
21) Marx, Zur Kritik usw., Japanese trans I., Collected Works, Vol. 13, p. 6. 
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that unless the relation of ownership is first established, the division of 
labour does not come to be realized. Again, putting it inversely, they are 
not of such a nature that the relations of ownership come to be estab-
lished where no division of labour exists or where the division of labour 
is given rise to before the relations of ownership come to be established. 
It would not be a correct way of understanding Marxian thought to 
think that the sequential order between the division of labour and the 
relations of ownership should be determined22l. 
Now, let us turn our attention to the well-known wording with respect 
to the dynamic relationships between productive powers and the relations 
of production. "When a society reaches a certain stage of its development, 
the material productive powers of that society come to be contradicted by 
the then existing various relations of production, in which they used to 
operate or with the relations of ownership which are no more than 
legal expressions of those relations of production. These relations are 
destined to become their fetters after having been their developing agen-
cy. Then it becomes time for a social revolution .... "221. I fear that 
the above quoted expression might be likely to lead to an understanding 
of the contradictory opposition between productive powers and the rela-
tions of production instead an understanding of dialectical opposition. 
Isn't it true that such an incorrect understanding is fairly popular and 
widespread? I am inclined to think that such is the reason why Marxian 
thought is on many occasions erroneously cognized through the above 
mentioned incorrect understanding. And I dare say that Marx himself was 
to blame, partly because he used many analogies to illustrate his idea. A 
few examples may be given here: -
In his "Summary of the Critique of Political Economy" he said, "When 
the well-off development of social individuals - in other words the 
historical development of productive powers which has been brought 
about by capital itself - reaches a certain point, it plays the role of 
checking the growth of capital itself instead of facilitating its develop-
ment. When this point is passed the development of productive powers 
begins to become a restriction on capital. Correspondingly, the relations 
of capital come to restrict the development of the productive powers of 
labour. When this point is reached, capital or wage labour inevitably 
begins to turn in respect to the development of social wealth and pro-
ductive powers into fetters which are destined to be thrown off. (als 
22) For instanee, Tadashi Doi, Forming Process of Materialistic Interpretation of H£story 
could be taken as such an example. This book is written for textbook usc, but it 
evokes much interest for researchers, because it shows his efforts at original contem-
plation o[ his mvn, 
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Fessel notwendig abgestreift werden) ..... "23) And "fetters" is immediately 
changed by "eclysis (AbhUten)". 
Next I would like to point out the following fact that the term rela-
tions of production is replaced by such terms as "integument" in those 
widely-known passages of Marx in which he gave a rough prediction of 
the future of world history in Chapter 25 of Volume I of "CaPital"w. If 
one more example is demanded I also refer to the closing part of chap-
ter 51 of Book III of the same book. In those passages productive powers 
are expressed as the "material foundation of the labour process" and the 
relations of production as the "social form of production", about which 
the fOllowing statement is given: 
To the extent that the labour process is solely a process between man 
and nature, its simple elements remain common to all social forms of 
development. But each specific historical form of this process further 
develops its material foundations and social forms. Whenever a certain 
stage of maturity has been reached, the specific historical form is discard-
ed and makes way for a higher one. The moment of arrival of such a 
crisis is disclosed by the depth and bredth attained by the contradictions 
and antagonisms between the distribution relations, and thus the specific 
historical form of their corresponding relations, of production on the one 
hand, and the productive forces, the productive powers and the develop-
ment of their agencies, on the other hand. A conflict then arises 
between the material development of production and its social form25). 
When we read this passage, we are apt to think that productive powers 
are material concept, while relations of production are a social concept, 
or regard the former as the content, and the latter as the form. This 
way of thinking is a misunderstanding. Nevertheless I think that there 
might be no fear of causing such a misunderstanding, if we have grasped 
the true relationships between the two concepts as stated above. 
(3) Varied Interpretations 
Let us make a historical review of some of the outstanding aspects 
foreign and Japanese - with respect to the relationships between 
productive powers and the relations of production. I will arrange these 
views in the calendar sequence of their publications. 
I will examine Plekhanov's view to begin with. His mature thought 
can be seen in the "Fundamental Problems of Marxism" (190B). Generally 
23) K. Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Qkonomie, 1953, S. 635, Japanese 
transl., Vol. 4, p.701. 
24) K. Marx, Das Kapital, Bd. 1 (Marx-Engels, Werke, Bd.23), S. 791, English cd. 
(Moscow, 1958), p. 793, Japanese trans I., Collected Works, Vol. 23. p. 995. 
25) Ibid" Bd. III (Marx-Engels, Werke, Bd. 26), S, 891, Japanese transl., Collected 
Works, Vol. 26, p. 1129. 
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speaking, Plekhanov's view is in a sense simple. Because his materialistic 
interpretation of history is characterized by a marked tendency of French 
objectivistic materialism, his view is more scientific than Hegel and Marx. 
For that reason he does not think about the positive role of the subjective 
entity in dialectical relationships. Therefore, I can't help contending 
that this tendency leaves no small room for criticism. But his view is 
soundly grounded and even at present his thought is worthy enough. 
His views on the problems with which I am concerned primarily 
lie in the point that the development of the various powers of production 
depends on physical geographical conditions. Plekhanov's tendency to-
wards geographical materialism has been frequently criticized. But he 
considers the diversities of nature and his materialism is more concrete 
than vulgar materialism which has only the uniformity of nature in 
view. In this respect, I agree with him. 
Plekhanov's view with respect to the relationships between the two 
concepts before mentioned is none other than "reciprocity", about which 
my criticism was previously given in the first section of this paper. His 
assertion is as follows: 
"Now, we know that the development of productive powers which 
ultimately prescribe all social relations depends in itself upon the nature 
of physical geographical conditions. But certain social relations, once 
established, exert a very strong readion in the development of productive 
powers. Therefore, what was originally a result becomes in turn a cause 
in itself. Among productive powers - its development and social orders 
- are brought forth reciprocal actions, and these actions take very differ-
ent forms indeed at different times"26). 
"The point we must make a special note of in this connection is 
that the relations of ownership established at a certain stage of develop-
ment of productive powers tend to facilitate the further development of 
such powers during a certain period of time, but, begin to retard its 
development when that period passes away. . ... "27) 
What "we must make a special note of in this connection" is the 
point that Plekhanov, who prescribed dialectical opposition as "recipro-
city", drew a line of demarcation between the two specific periods in 
the historical development of economy and he regarded the former 
26) G. Plekhanov, Die Grundprobleme des Marxismus, hrsg, von D, Rjazanov, Marx-
istische Bibliothek, Bd. 21, 19, SS.46-47. This text is the one translated from Russian 
version into German by Karl Schmuckle. As a German version there is another texL 
translated by M. Nachimson, which the author took the trouble to read through. 
This was published as the "autorisierte Uebersetzung" by Dietz o[ Stuttgart in 1910, 
~ haven't compared them carefully in every point, but there is a difference in word~ 
mg to some extent. My translation here is made from Rjazanoy. 
27) Ihid., S. 61. 
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period as days of development for productive powers and the latter period 
as days of retardation for them. I have no intention at all of saying that 
it is meaningless to divide economic organisations which are historically 
changing into two separate periods, but if viewed more closely, it is clear 
enough that since productive powers and the relations of production con-
ceived in terms of dialectical opposition are also connected together in 
the relationship of "mutual reliance" then the development of the former 
is, always, being expedited at any stage of development. Taking capi-
talist economic organisations as an example, even when contradictory 
oppositions are growing severely, there are instances where productive 
powers keep developing, being expedited by capital, and their development 
is never totally retarded. If Plekhanov's words were read literally, such 
a state of things would not take place, but it is contrary to the establi-
shed facts. It can be admitted that the contradictions between capital 
and labour are extremely severe these days in any capitalist country, and 
yet it would be wrong to say that such contradictions are so severe that 
no development of productive powers can be observed there. The progress 
of science and its applied uses are making such great strides even when 
a war is being fought that this must be one of the greatest representations 
of all social contradictions. Any theory that does not acknowledge these 
actual facts is abstract. But the onl y problematical point is that such 
development of productive powers under the specific current capitalist 
system is being actualized not for the benefit of human emancipation 
but for the advantage of capital, owing to the restraint on capital as 
originally contended by Marx, or rather that the result and development 
of productive powers is now making the state of human alienation more 
and more intensified, and also making the realization of primary human 
nature inflect in an unsound direction. In this sense I can conclude 
that Plekhanov is wrong in his way of understanding the changes in the 
relationships between the two concepts. 
;'-Iextly let us see the interpretation made by Tamizo Kushida (1883-
1934). He wrote an article entitled "Relationships of Conditions in the 
Materialistic Interpretation of History" (about 1925)28). This treatise was 
written as a criticism of one of the writings by Ha jime Kawakami (1879-
1946) : there Kushida called the relations of production "economic rela-
tions of a society arising out of the relationships of the division of labour 
and privately owned property", while he regarded productive powers as 
"socially applied natural powers, human powers and techniques·. And 
he further went on to criticize Kawakami's wording such as "each is the 
cause of the other", contending that such a term as "cause" shouldn't be 
28) Complete Works of Tamizo Kllshida, VOl. 1, p. 236-. 
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used to denote such a relationship and that it should be described as 
"mutually mediating". The above reveals that Kushida also regarded 
the relations of dialectical opposition as reciprocity. Nevertheless we 
should appreciate that both Kawakami and Kushida had an idea, though 
vaguely, that there exists something beyond the causal relations between 
the two concepts mentioned. In addition it must be particularly mentioned 
here that their attention was adequately directed toward the fact that 
productive powers is a "more dominant motive", compared with the rela-
tions of production. 
Kawakami who was criticized in this way by Kushida did not show 
any theoretical progress as far as our immediate problems are concerned. 
Since his most coherent writing is in fact a book entitled "The Second 
Story of Poverty" (1929-30), I shall take up his final view in this publi-
cation29l• 
Kawakami held that productive powers is "more in£]uential" than the 
relations of production, but this has not been substantiated. Furthermore 
his explanation of the relationships of opposition between those two 
categories is also insu££icient30 l. In addition he made a statement in 
trying to clarify "the identity of things in opposition" - evidently he must 
have felt the necessity of this clarification by Lenin - that "the relations 
of production come in themselves to be component elements for productive 
powers under certain conditions,"3ll but such an explanation is awkward. 
This awkward explanation is a result of there being no proper knowledge of 
the dialectical meanings of the concept of "identity" on Kawakami's part. 
However, the one point we must make a special note of regarding 
Kawakami's view is that the relationships between the two concepts are 
explained by using the analogy of the relationships between the human 
body and the clothing to cover it3Zl• Such an explanation might have 
come to be used perhaps partly because Marx himsel£ used such terms as 
"integument" and "take it off" and partly because Kawakami was also in 
the habit of using analogical reasoning, but after all he didn't make 
enough progress to demonstrate any logical structure beyond the level of 
analogy33). As already mentioned, a man and his clothes arc of such a 
29) Taken [romtheWorks of Rajime Kawakami, Vol. 2. In "The Second Story of Poverty" 
is written that it was intended to make an "elucidation" of Lenin's narration 
about the materialistic interpretation of history. This indicates his very honest per-
sonality, but at the same time it also shows a propagating tendency which was his 
academic tradition, There is a doubt whether it is desirable for the progress of 
science that scientific study should be used [or the purpose 01 propagation. As to 
this point I agree LO SOme extent with the view held by Prof. Nobuyuki Okuma. 
30) Ibid., pp. 20B-21I. 
31) Ibid., p. 21I. 
32) Ibid., pp. 212-213. 
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nature that each of them can exist independently of. each other, and 
when he puts on his clothes, the relationships such as a good fit or a bad 
fit come to be brought forth, but the productive powers and the relations 
of production are by no means of such a nature. From the very begin-
ning they are two categories which stand in mutual opposition to each 
other and which are united in one at the same time. Two phases of 
unification and opposition are combined together and the logical structure 
of the dialectic, indeed, is formed in a so to speak twofold opposition. 
Judging from these thoughts, I can't help saying that Kawakami never 
attained dialectical recognition. 
Now, turning to Professor Kyuzo Asobe, he made his "Value and 
Historical Materialism" (1950) public shortly after the end of the War. 
He attempted in this book to elucidate the Marxian theory of value by 
following the context of Hegelian logic. Moreover he engaged himself 
in the contemplation of the views held by philosophers in the Soviet 
Union, such as Mitzin and Raritzevitch, as well as by economists such as 
Duokol, Abezgaus and Koffman. And he drew the conclusion that pro-
ductive powers and the relations of production are to be explained by 
the categories of content and form. 
Productive powers and the relations of production can be understood 
to some degree by the concepts of substance or content and form, as it is 
possible to understand economy and law by these concepts. But we can 
not understand the total relationships by these concepts.· If we hold the 
Hegelian view point of absolute idealism, the identity of substance and 
form can be recognized, because the former realizes itself by attaining the 
latter and the latter realizes itself by containing the former in itself. 
But when we examine the correlations of the two concepts in reality, we 
can see a more complex correlation, than that of substance and form. It 
is more tangible to correlate the two concepts on the basis of the "identity 
of things in opposition" in the sense explained above. 
Next, in order to become familiar with the situation in Soviet scho-
lastic circles during the Stalinist period, I shall mention the enunciations 
given in "Historical Materialism" compiled by F. V. Konstantinov of the 
Academy of Sciences of USSR. 
It was a general tendency in essays of social sciences in Soviet Russia, 
particular! y in the Stalinist period to repeat and obtrude specific views, 
33) Japanese economists who were educated in the 19th century, especially those who 
taught in the national universities and colleges were under the strong influence of 
German Historical School. Hajime Kawakami was not an exception. The German 
Historical School was fond of thinking analogically and they called economic Jaws 
the law of an analogy (as in the case of Karl Knies), It was natural that Kawakami 
thought analogically. 
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rather than to make logical statement, and to divert one's attention from 
the main problem at issue by quoting the "authoritative" words of Marx, 
Engels and Lenin so that readers might well be forced to agree that only 
those particular views were right and that any standpoints other than 
those were wrong. The books we are going to take up are also much 
characterized by this tendency. 
Now, Konstantinov - the part which we are taking up was written 
by this compiler - correctly asserted that the form of ownership of pro-
ductive powers prescribes the relations of production, but the logic of 
the relationships between the two state of affairs is not clear enough. 
Although it is asserted that the mode of production is formed by "a 
combination" of the tw0111, his explanation of the way this "combination" 
is made doesn't go beyond reciprocal interaction, and he also regards 
productive powers as the content and the relations of production as the 
form 35!, which I have already criticized above. In short as far as the 
relationships between the two concepts concerned, Konstantinov's view is 
no better than the popular view of reciprocity. 
Lastly let us take up the view held by Mr. Kichiroku Tanaka. What 
I am going to discuss here is concerned with his two essays: one written 
in 1951 and the other in 196016). 
According to his assertion, logic termed by him the "logic of circular 
movement" is essentially required to grasp the relationships between pro-
ductive powers and the relations of production in a dynamic way. What is 
implied by the "logic of circular movement" is dialectical logic, which is 
different from the ordinary logic through which things are grasped, as it 
were, graphically on a flat level. Tanaka's view is very hard to under-
stand. Upon realising it, he himself is often obliged to repeat his 
efforts at expressing it by saying "in plain words" and "for an easier 
understanding". In spite of all this we feel great difficulty in follow-
ing his narration. Nevertheless it is written on a much higher level than 
any analysis or synthesis we have ever seen before. He shows the pro-
cesses of how practical human being and society come to be established, 
starting from material production and then through human conscious-
ness. It can be appreciated as one of the most advanced theoretical 
treatises we have so far had. 
According to this writer, Marx has made clear the creative process 
of nature from material production to practical subject of humanity. And 
34) Compiled by Konstantinov, transl. by Soviet Researchers' Ass., MateriaUstt'c Inter-
pretatio" of History, Part I, Otsuki Shoten, 1951. (The original copy being publi,hed 
in 1940. ) 
35) Ibid., p. 115. 
36) Ibid., pp. 139-140. 
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this process means that the original nature returns to itself through the 
objectivation of humanity by practical activity. This movement is, in a 
sense, a circular movement. 
Mr. Tanaka explains this movement by dividing it into two kinds. 
One is the development of vertical movements. There it is maintained 
that productive powers keep developing to the productive entity and then 
to cognitive entity and finally to the social and practical entity: it serves 
the purpose for the original nature to accomplish the essential qualities 
of nature through the instrumentality of "humanized nature", thus, to 
make a comeback to nature and to actualize the actuality of nature. 
The other is the development of lateral movements, where the very hu-
man entity, itself created out of nature, first turned to the relations of 
production and then to the forms of circulation, and finally induced the 
development from primitive life to life of a higher level through the 
instrumentality of communications, such as spoken as well as written 
language. The improvement of the subjective entity to a higher and 
higher level means the return to nature through the instrumentality of 
self negation. Thus tribal communal life is to develop into a global 
society. 
What supports these two kinds of development is, "the logic of cir-
cular movements": in other words, the logic of repeated movements of 
progress and regress in succession by pursuing a process of disunion and 
unification. Such is Mr. Tanaka's standpoint. 
In these works is treated the problem of unification of productive 
powers and relations of production in the productive process. Putting it 
in other words, the structure through which a particular mode of produc-
tion developes into the whole society is aimed at. In short what he is 
treating there covers much wider field than our problem is concerned 
with. As to our problem, since nothing is written in detail except the 
movements toward "vertical development" and "lateral development", I 
cannot content myself, but I feel grateful to find that his work cqntains a 
great many suggestive points. Only it is a matter of regret that as a 
result of his effort to stick to the materialistic standpoint, his tenacity in 
holding to "material substance" and "nature" prevents him from free 
thinking. 
IV Summary of My View 
I think that my own positive view should be given now, companng 
the varied ways of thinking which I discussed above. But I haven't 
arrived at a final conclusion yet. All that I can do now is to present 
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here some materials to ask the readers for criticism by summarising my 
view. 
The starting point to consider is nature in her original state. Nature 
created human· beings in the course of reproduction and evolution. A 
man born of such nature begins to cognize his own purpose. He finds 
himself standing in opposition to nature and behaves practically to actualize 
his purpose. The practical activities of man come to actualize the uni-
fication of nature, though standing in a relation of opposition to nature, 
by modifying the movements and changes of nature and by imposing 
his will upon the movements of natural phenomena. 
This unification is not a simple thing to accomplish. When he has 
not enough knowledge of the substance of natural phenomena and the 
means of actualizing his will, his practical intention comes to be clashed 
with the force of nature. Nevertheless, man's cognition of the substantial 
qualities of nature and the means of actualizing his will- since a man 
himself is part of nature, too, the means of actualizing his will can't be 
found, needless to say, a part from the cognition of the susbtantial quali-
ties of human made nature - keep progressing while mutually standing 
in OppositIOn. Thus, nature and man actualize the unification by repeat-
ing the processes of the two movements, first of mutual cooperation in 
a state of opposition and secondly of opposition to each other in a state 
of cooperation. Hence, man's movements, if viewed from a wide point 
of view, become something to which an old saying, "partaking in the 
constant process of the evolution of nature" seems to be applicable, and 
the movements of nature actualize themselves by comprehending human 
activity. From a macro aspect, the history of nature is brought in line 
with human history. That Marx made use of the word naturalism in 
the same sense as humanism in his" Economic Philosophical Manuscripts" 
(1844) is to be understood in such a way. 
Marx's thought was based on such a gigantic background. As to 
whether or not such a magnificent structure is suitable to cover the 
history of nature and humanity, we are not able to determine. But he 
dared to enact such a grand play of contemplative thought and there is 
no need to say that it was on the "real basis" that a corner stone of his 
thought was founded, and the very corner-stone of that foundation was 
the mode of production, and in the idea of the mode of production was 
included the whole of productive powers and the relations of production. 
By productive powers is meant the various effective conditions, concerned 
with subjective and objective entities in the course of human making. 
The word "making" is an English translation of "poiesis" which we often 
come across in classical Greek thoughts. Not all productive powers are 
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matter. Indeed, some of them, such as land or underground resources is 
matter, some like the organs of the human body are also biological organs, 
but some are tools or instrument which are produced by man's labour and 
can be regarded as extensions and magnifications of human bodily organs, 
and sometimes scientific abilities, which are not matter at all. Further-
more, the very ability to unite the various factors of productive powers 
together is counted as a kind of productive powers. These abilities are 
represented in "concrete useful labour" and this labour actualizes itself 
in the form of cooperation or the division of labour. 
On the other hand, what is meant by relations of production are 
human relationships as a whole arising out of the forms of ownership of 
productive powers which are brought forth in human "acting". The word 
'acting' used here to make a distinction from 'making' is "praxis" as used 
in classical Greek thought. The ability of acting is represented by 
"abstract human labour". Acting comes to actualize its substantial qualities 
when it is considered in connection with man's motive or purpose. 
Whether it is intended from a selfish motive or in the public interest 
determines its substantial qualities. 
We must make a special note of the fact that making and acting 
overlap each other, resulting in human activity. Human activities must 
be considered in this duality. By the ownership of productive powers is 
meant social conditions under which production is carried on. According 
to the ownership of productive powers, the social conditions of production 
are different. 
There are different cases of such conditions. There are some where 
productive powers are for the most part buried in the whole society, as in 
a primitive community. There are some, where, although a part of them 
may be commonly owned by the people as a whole, the rest of them are 
owned by particular groups and each group can determine, use or dispose 
of them as in feudal society. But in modern capitalist society, all pro-
ductive powers, as a rule, are owned by individuals and these individuals 
have the right to use or dispose of them freely. -In these different cases, 
we speak of collective or private ownership. Productive powers represent 
themselves in the shape of ownership and discharge their own special 
functions. There we have varied types of human relations. And all such 
relations arising out of human acting in producing economic goods are 
called the relations Of production. 
Human activity has two phases of making and acting. II is neither 
that one phase is main purpose and the other its means, nor that one is 
the content and the other the form. Yet each of them does exist, res-
pecti vely carrying a peculiar significance, and for that reason each of 
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them stands in opposition to the other as an extremity, without being 
comprehended by the other. In short, making and acting form the 
relationship of dialectical opposition mentioned previously. 
If each element of productive powers as an element of making is 
put separately, it does not work at all or does not work efficiently. The 
elements work unified together in the labour process. 
On the other hand, if we regard productive powers as an element of 
acting, they are owned either collectively or individually. And we have 
some relations of ownership with each other. 
In this way, productive powers and relations of production have 
respecti vely a specific existence of their own, and neither of them is a 
thing to be comprehended by the other. Yet they do not exist in two 
different states. Just in the sense that making is acting seen from the 
subjecti ve point of view - or in the sense that acting is making when 
seen from the objective point of view, so productive powers and relations 
of production are two phases of one and the same labour process, i. e. two 
phases standing in opposition to one another. Although the two have a 
dual structure, they are one social reality which is in one dynamic state. 
In this sense productive powers and the relations of production are two, 
and at the same time only one: in other words they are in the 
relationship of "dialectical opposition". 
Now, I think that I could describe the basic aspect of my view with 
respect to productive powers and the relations of production through all 
that was discussed above. However, if I intend to develop the problem 
more concretely, I shall further have to touch on a few more complex 
and important points of discussion. When the form of ownership is to 
be argued, we must take into consideration the fact of alienation. But 
III this paper, I must omit this important issue. 
